President Donald Trump presented with a replica of a Golden Crown from the Silla Kingdom by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung.
Nearly a year into his second term, Donald Trump’s approach to key Southeast and East Asian partners offers a clear picture of how U.S. diplomacy has been re-wired under Trump 2.0. Months of tariff threats, fractured alliances, and negotiations, beginning with the April “Liberation Day” tariffs and leading to the Asia tours more recently, reveal a method to diplomacy defined less by partnerships and more in the realm of performance. Former diplomats are calling this “far more transactional,” where personal access determines influence rather than mutual respect and win-win outcomes that traditionally defined diplomatic protocol with the United States.
Trump’s “Liberation Day” announced reciprocal tariffs ranging from 10 percent to 50 percent on nearly all U.S. trading partners, prompting over 50 countries to rush and seek negotiations. While larger economies like China and Canada retaliated with matching tariffs on $155 billion of U.S. goods and the European Union responded that it was ready for a trade war, Japan, Malaysia, and South Korea ,however, had an entirely different response.
What began in negotiations that reflected their geopolitical weight ended in carefully choreographed performances designed to please Trump and secure economic relief during the October summits. Southeast and East Asia thus showcased a watershed in a personalised, performative, and coercive diplomacy with the current U.S. administration.
From Dialogue to Directives
At the outset of this second term, Trump’s relations with his Asian allies were cordial. Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba’s February visit was well received, with Trump praising him and the countries’ decades-long friendship. South Korea and Malaysia, too, saw steady diplomatic engagements. However, the April tariffs concretised Trump’s strategy as one that cannot be shielded by historical partnerships or alliances.
During this period, Trump’s accusations followed a pattern—Japan blocked U.S. cars and rice, while South Korea ran tariffs four times higher than America’s, despite receiving military support.
In response, South Korea’s acting President Han Duck-soo explicitly stated that fighting back would not improve the situation, with South Korean officials frequenting Washington and scrambling to seek relief.
Likewise, Japan’s Economy Minister Ryosei Akazawa was specially appointed as lead negotiator for tariffs on April 7, with officials making multiple trips to Washington focused on securing relief via concession as opposed to banking on WTO procedures.
Malaysia, without protection from an extended alliance with the U.S., was more vulnerable. The effects of Trump’s tariffs destabilised Malaysia’s domestic growth, requiring a special parliamentary session in May.
U.S. Secretary Scott Bessent had also previously highlighted how governments were “much more keen to come to the table, get this done, and then go home and campaign on it.” This business-style framing of negotiations points to a change in U.S. and international trade policy—one where countries bend to Trump’s pressure for “quick deals” rather than carefully thought-out agreements focused on protecting national interests and long-term partnerships.
Trump’s eventual July letters to various countries were essentially ultimatums, dictating tariff rates with warnings of “upward or downward” modifications depending on the relationship. Each letter described trade deficits as a major threat to the U.S. economy and particularly its national security.
From Partnership to Performance
By the time Trump embarked on his high-profile Southeast and East Asia engagements later in the year, all three nations seemed to have recognised that securing favourable terms required an elaborate and performative validation of Trump as seen during his six-day Asia tour.
The strategic response from these nations was stark. Stuck between China’s growing assertiveness, waning WTO measures, and strong economic dependencies on the U.S. market, they saw little alternative but to court Trump and personalise engagement.
Trump’s arrival in South Korea was distinguished by vivid imagery of warplanes escorting Air Force One, military bands performing YMCA during a 21-gun salute, and Trump being presented with a replica Silla-era gold crown alongside South Korea’s highest decoration. In line with Trump’s aesthetic preferences, President Lee even wore a custom gold tie.
In Japan, Trump was courted with gold-gilded palace rooms where Prime Minister Takaichi invoked her mentor, the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, all while symbolising a “golden age” of relations. Over a carefully curated lunch featuring American rice and beef, Takaichi also presented a map showcasing Japan’s investments.
Trump dancing on the tarmac in Malaysia sums up how effective his welcome was. Prime Minister Ibrahim went as far as to break protocol by riding in Trump’s limousine.
These displays were not just ornamentation, but a signal of a deeper, more calculated response to a president who values a highly visible loyalty. Pageantry thus becomes one of the most valuable currencies in Trump 2.0.
Post-summit, Trump was full of praise, emphasising that he would help Japan at any time and promising a fantastic relationship with Takaichi. Japan was able to maintain the 15% tariff rate, ensure that the 550 billion‑dollar investment MOU would not be escalated again, and sign a new rare earth minerals deal. Trump called Malaysia a great and vibrant country, with the nation securing a treaty-locked cap of 19 percent tariffs, with 1,711 tariff lines exempted with 0 percent tariff rates.
He described South Korea’s visit as a great trip, with a great Prime Minister and the country securing a tariff reduction from 25 percent to 15 percent after months of difficult negotiations, committing $20 billion annually in cash investments plus $150 billion for U.S. shipbuilding operations.
The Tariffication of Alliance
A major feature in Trump’s diplomacy over the past year is how tariffs have consumed the U.S.’s relationships with Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia. Policies that once sought to broaden strategic cooperation and partnerships in security, regional stability, technology, and shared democratic values were largely packaged and shadowed under securing tariff relief. While traditional alliances focus on multiple dimensions of cooperation, the conversations in Trump 2.0 have centred on tariffs and how countries can respond to prevent them.
These summits in Asia merely concretised what these nations came to realise through months of erratic negotiations that, with Trump, steady policy discussions rarely saw outcomes. The golden crowns, custom ties, and personalised gifts are strategic calculations meant to appease Trump’s responsiveness to flattery and pageantry. Performances that publicly and visually showcased his authority as the Tariff King are an easier way to transform Trump’s disposition from punisher to patron.
In Trump’s second year of administration, one can expect to see an undermining of regional frameworks like ASEAN that traditionally promote collective bargaining and rules-based engagement. As individual nations have scurried to win favour with Washington through personalised deals, future coordinated regional responses to other shared challenges, be it in security or climate, look increasingly dim.
Serene Joshua is a young ambassador with the Security Studies Program at Carnegie India. She holds a bachelor’s degree in Sociology with a minor in International Relations from Ashoka University. Serene has previously worked as a research assistant under the Koita Centre for Digital Health and the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. Her research focused on the digital economy of India, with relevance to health policy and RTI reform, examining transparency and public health delivery.