When Donald Trump imposed an additional 25 per cent tariff on Indian goods earlier in August, it reignited speculation about the durability of New Delhi’s ‘strategic autonomy’ discourse.
For some, it was a sign of turning tides in New Delhi-Washington relations; for others, it opened the door to the possibility of a “reset” with China – all the more so as Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited New Delhi earlier this month. The argument runs that if one great power relationship sours, another must sweeten.
It is a captivatingly simple proposition, but one that overlooks the structural realities shaping New Delhi’s choices. Foreign relations are by design, a balancing act between principles and pragmatism. Tactical moves such as tariff responses, summit-level engagements or diplomatic signalling can be reactive. But strategy in itself demands consistency, clarity, and a long-term vision. India’s conduct has long reflected this duality: defending sovereignty, maintaining strategic autonomy and cultivating multiple partnerships without being drawn into binding alignments.
The proposition of swinging from one power to another ignores this tradition, as well as the reality that China is not simply a counterweight to Washington, but a structural challenger to India’s ascent, one whose influence New Delhi has to manage, not embrace. Such a management also requires a disciplined sense of priorities. A nation may not control the actions of external actors, but it can ensure its responses are anchored in long-term national goals that cushion the harm those actions cause.
China, for all its ills and purposes, is on that path. Despite sweeping tariffs, Beijing remains confident of riding out the punch, just as it did during Trump’s first term, largely because it anchors its response in long-term objectives rather than short-term reactions. This does not make Beijing an example to emulate, much less a partner to align with. But it does underline the value of strategic steadiness in the face of provocations. India’s own strategic environment demands similar discipline. However tempting it may seem to leverage tensions with one great power to draw closer to another, the structural realities do not change.
Beijing will continue to constrain New Delhi’s rise where possible, through economic influence in South Asia, assertiveness along the Line of Actual Control and by shaping regional forums to its advantage. Wang Yi’s travel to Kabul and Islamabad immediately after his meetings with India’s Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, and National Security Adviser reflects this practice in action; even while engaging New Delhi, Beijing is simultaneously reinforcing its own regional foothold. These aspects are an enduring reality of the India-China strategic landscape. It is precisely in this context that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tianjin, China, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit should be read. Presuming it as a pivot towards Beijing in response to tensions with Washington is to miss the point entirely.
High-level engagements with China, as was the case with the Chinese Foreign Minister’s visit to New Delhi, are not about altering the competitive core of the relationship; they are about managing risk in a rivalry that cannot be wished away. The logic is not accommodation but calibration – deterring where necessary, engaging where possible, and preserving strategic autonomy in the face of a neighbour whose long-term objectives remain at odds with New Delhi’s own. Tariffs , trade disputes o r diplomatic snubs from Washington do not change this fundamental truth; China will remain India’s most persistent strategic challenge, regardless of the ebbs and flows of its relationship with the United States. To view foreign policy as a choice between Washington, Beijing and for that matter even Moscow, is to miss the essence of India’s post-Independence strategic thinking.
Strategic autonomy, rooted in India’s tradition of non-alignment but adapted to a multipolar world, is about resisting binary choices between great powers. New Delhi’s goal is not to oscillate between Washington and Beijing depending on the week’s headlines, but to consolidate its position as a pole in its own right. New Delhi may not control the actions of others, but it can control the clarity with which it sets and communicates its priorities. Resisting short-term temptations is therefore not an abstract ideal but a necessity dictated by the demands of long-term strategy. The success of Indian diplomacy will ultimately be measured not by the tactical moves of the moment, but by the cumulative security, influence and autonomy built through a principled strategy sustained over decades.