New Delhi: In a remark that has stirred fresh unease across West Asia and the Middle East, Iran’s Foreign Minister has suggested that the country’s most powerful military arm is now operating with unusual latitude.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran’s elite force spearheading the counterattack against the US and Israel, is acting independently, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has said, stressing that its attack on Oman “was not our choice”.
That carefully worded assertion has pushed the IRGC back into the global spotlight. At a time of heightened regional tension, Tehran appears to be signalling that its most powerful military arm is continuing operations under previously issued guidance rather than fresh political direction. Whether this is damage control or a candid admission, the implications are serious.
IRGC: A force shaped by Ruhollah Khomeini’s revolution
Before he was killed, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was Iran’s supreme leader since 1989 and a (known and) sworn enemy of the West. The IRGC, though loyal to him, was created by his predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in May 1979 in the turbulent aftermath of the Iranian Revolution.
From the outset, it was designed to be different from Iran’s conventional military. While the regular army, known as the Artesh, was tasked with defending national borders, the IRGC was meant to protect the ideological core of the Islamic Republic.
Iran’s constitution institutionalised this dual military structure. Over the decades, however, the IRGC’s influence has steadily expanded, often eclipsing the traditional armed forces in both capability and political weight.
Crucially, the Guards report directly to the Supreme Leader. With Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reported killed during the latest US-Israel offensive, the command structure now appears unsettled. Tehran’s latest messaging suggests the IRGC is executing broad standing orders issued before the leadership crisis.
“Oman attack was not our choice”
Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi’s remarks in an interview with Al Jazeera were striking in tone. Responding to questions about the strike on an Omani port, he said the action “was not our choice”. He added that Iranian forces had been advised to exercise caution in selecting targets.
Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi:
What happened in Oman was not our choice.
We have already told our Armed Forces to be careful about the targets they choose.
Our military units are now, in fact, independent and somewhat isolated, and they are acting based on general… pic.twitter.com/g0l9Te2HNa
— Clash Report (@clashreport) March 1, 2026
He went on to say that military units are now operating “independently and somehow isolated”, following general instructions that had already been laid down.
The statement performs a delicate diplomatic balancing act. On one hand, it distances Iran’s civilian leadership from controversial strikes that risk inciting its Gulf neighbours. On the other hand, it projects continuity of military posture despite uncertainty at the top.
No matter the balancing act, the diplomacy is lost as the comment inevitably raises concerns.
If the IRGC is acting with greater autonomy, the question of political control in Iran becomes harder to answer.
Not a typical military equation
Most countries prepare for worst-case scenarios, including the possibility that political leadership could be disrupted during conflict. But Iran’s situation is distinctive. The IRGC is not simply another branch of the armed forces. It has evolved into one of the most powerful institutions within the state.
The Guards control a substantial portion of Iran’s ballistic missile programme and much of its arsenal of armed drones. These capabilities alone give the organisation considerable strategic weight.
Beyond the battlefield, the IRGC has built an extensive economic footprint. It is involved in major construction projects, port operations, telecommunications networks and even specialised medical services. This financial muscle provides the group with a degree of operational independence rare for a military body.
In effect, even in moments of political uncertainty, the IRGC retains the means to act.
‘Most ferocious operation in Iran’s history…’
Following reports of Khamenei’s killing, the IRGC issued a strongly worded statement promising revenge and to avenge the Supreme Leader’s assassination. The message was steeped in the revolutionary language that has long defined the organisation’s public posture.
“The most ferocious offensive operation in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s armed forces will begin any moment now,” the Guards posted on Telegram. It went on to add that it will target the “occupied territories and American terrorist bases” in the region. It went on to add that “the hand of revenge of the Iranian nation for a severe, decisive and regrettable punishment for the murderers of the Imam of the Ummah will not let go of them.”
While such rhetoric is not unusual, the timing has drawn attention. When a powerful, ideologically driven force signals retaliation amid leadership flux, regional capitals tend to listen carefully. Gulf states, already wary of escalation, are likely to watch Iran’s next moves closely. So too will Tel Aviv and Washington, DC — if the Trump administration is prudent enough.
IRGC is more formidable than a conventional force
In purely military terms, the IRGC is formidable. Although smaller in manpower than the regular army, it is widely viewed as Iran’s most influential fighting force. It fields its own ground troops, naval units and aerospace command.
Its external operations wing, the Quds Force, has played a central role in extending Iran’s influence across the region. Over the years, it has supported Syria under Bashar al-Assad, backed Hezbollah in Lebanon and assisted Houthi forces in Yemen.
This network gives Tehran strategic reach well beyond its borders. It also means decisions taken within the IRGC can quickly reverberate across multiple theatres.
Inside Iran, the organisation’s influence is reinforced by the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary force often deployed during periods of domestic unrest. In recent protests, Basij units were seen confronting demonstrators, underlining the Guards’ dual role in external defence and internal control.
IRGC acting autonomously? Minister’s message and reality mismatch
It would be prudent to treat Araghchi’s remarks with caution. Iran has long practised calibrated ambiguity in its public messaging. Civilian leaders have, at times, sought distance from military actions to ease diplomatic pressure.
Even so, one fact is difficult to ignore. The IRGC today is not merely an instrument of state policy. It is one of the central power centres within the Islamic Republic.
If uncertainty at the top continues, the Guards may find their operational latitude expanding further. That possibility is what makes the Foreign Minister’s comments so closely watched.
For now, the administration in Tehran insists that the situation remains under control. The region on edge, however, will judge not by words but by the IRGC’s next move.