The Narendra Modi government converted an economically disastrous idea such as demonetisation into a political win. It dealt with a brutal Covid-19 pandemic that took millions of lives and devastated livelihoods, yet emerged politically unscathed.
The Modi government played with fire on land acquisition and farm laws, yet pulled back without getting burnt. And despite its limited success in pulling off a manufacturing revolution to generate jobs on scale, it has remained politically dominant and maintained its multi-class and multi-caste alliance.
The Modi government confronted a serious national security crisis with a far more powerful adversary, China, and had to redefine the idea of normalcy for the sake of peace, yet it did not pay a domestic political price. India dealt with a highly polarised West-Russia landscape and a China that was either actively hostile or passively aggressive or absent, yet pulled off a spectacular G20 presidency. It had to secure its interests with diametrically different American administrations with almost opposing priorities, and yet it was able to be friends with the sitting administration while still having enough goodwill with the preceding power constellation.
How did a government that has been so adept in dealing with the domestic and international landscape, and overcoming its own missteps and mistakes, fumble in reading the US? How did a government so sharp in reading danger signals not manage friction when there were clear possibilities of trouble with the US from earlier this year, but definitely from May 10 when Donald Trump claimed credit for the ceasefire? How is it that in over 90 days since then, India, with all its equities and power, has failed to shift the conversation or make enough inroads into Trump’s world to find a meeting ground while keeping to its redlines? To be sure, it has been difficult to predict the US president’s next move, but there are countries that have managed to get their (limited) way.
Let there be no doubt about the severity of the crisis. India is worse off among all the regional competitors for investment, and in its own immediate neighbourhood in terms of access to the US market. This has implications way beyond trade, for suddenly, the signal to American capital about India is of uncertainty, despite the charms of its huge market and extensive talent pool. This puts under strain India’s broader economic modernisation roadmap that hinges at least partly, if not substantially, on western investment and technology partnerships to boost manufacturing and generate mass employment.
India is confronting repeated blows against its core strategic concerns: Trump appears more than willing to make long-term strategic concessions for a deal with China. Pakistan’s comeback to the Washington DC theatre, even if it is only in the short-term as some pundits believe, is arguably on a more broad-based diplomatic, economic and strategic footing than even 2001 when it was driven by the narrow counter terror frame in Afghanistan. And, India is paying a price for US-Russia tensions in ways that it hasn’t for decades.
India is also staring at a crisis in the people-to-people relationship, given the challenges in getting student visas, the backlash against H1Bs in Trump’s base and intense spurt in anti-Indian and anti-Hindu racist rhetoric from the White supremacist Right.
The biggest crisis, of course, is there are no easy pathways out of it anymore. The more time has passed, the more rhetoric has got meaner, the more demands have escalated and become public, the less political space there is to make compromises. The Indian political and street mood is now, justifiably, furious at how the country has been treated by the US even as everyone realises the importance of that country and the bilateral relationship.
There are structural factors at play, for core contradictions on trade openness and relationships with third countries have come to the fore. There are personality-centric issues at play, especially on the American side with a president who revels in sharpening contradictions with his own country’s institutions, the international system, and allies and partners in the quest for political or personal or financial wins. And, there are unanticipated variables and events that have affected the chessboard.
But none of this can take away from the fact that the government may have missed out on multiple opportunities to manage Trump. This is particularly striking since the political leadership has usually been alert in responding creatively in difficult situations, managing narratives, engaging with all kinds of interlocutors, unleashing diplomatic charm in the external domain or pre-empting rivals by appropriating political issues in the domestic domain, finding wins-wins when possible and framing compromises as wins when necessary.
To be sure, as Pratap Bhanu Mehta has eloquently and wisely argued, the Trumpian project is an imperial project and dignity is essential. But avoiding being in the direct firing line of the imperial project was in national interest and the government’s core diplomatic duty. And, yes, there may have been ways to do it without compromising on India’s historic stance on third-party mediation, or on core interests of small farmers, or on Indian manufacturing potential. And, this was possible because a childishly transparent, vain and corrupt Trump world is always open to a better deal and packaging has always been more central to his politics than substance.
To return to the puzzle then, what happened? A detailed empirical account will only emerge once the crisis passes, actors move on from their current roles, and files are declassified. And even a more specific discussion on who got what wrong and when and what could have been done need not detain us here.
One school of thought is there was a problem with the personnel chosen to make judgments on the ground and offer advice. Another is that India may have genuinely misread the problem, or been unable to anticipate second or third order consequences of Trumpian rupture. A third suggests that there may have been a problem with the channels selected for execution of goals; India’s adversaries and critics have been constantly in Trump’s ear while India’s perspective has failed to register a mark. It could well be a combination; the problems with personnel, judgment and execution, may have resulted in a problem in decision making.
And, to be fair, all of this may have been exacerbated by domestic concerns, not just of the man (and woman) on the street, but the political Opposition.
After 11 years, this is the biggest challenge facing Narendra Modi, and he may want to consider a reset. It could start with foreign policy but a full Kamraj-plan style reset across the party and government may not be a bad idea at this time, especially given the ambitious agenda the Prime Minister laid out in his Independence Day speech. This could bring fresh energy and ideas and shatter vested interests to help India prepare for the coming political, economic and strategic storms. For coming they are.