PM Modi’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Tianjin signaled crisis management, not friendship. Despite deep trade ties, border disputes, Pakistan, and mistrust define India-China ties, while India’s real strategic bet lies with the US.
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping in Tianjin on August 31, the images were striking. Two leaders whose nations have spent decades circling each other in suspicion suddenly looked like partners in dialogue. The question, as always, hung heavy: can India and China ever be friends?
A Fragile History
The record says otherwise. The 1962 war lingers like an unhealed scar. The Galwan clash of 2020, in which soldiers were killed on both sides, proved just how combustible the border remains. Since then, New Delhi has banned Chinese apps, tightened investment rules, and fortified the Himalayas. Beijing has poured concrete into disputed zones and leaned harder on its “iron brother” Pakistan.
The Tianjin meeting was not a breakthrough. It was crisis management. For Modi, keeping the border from exploding is a necessity. For Xi, engagement buys space to manage growing challenges in the Pacific. Mutual caution can prevent conflict. It cannot manufacture friendship. Yet the photo opportunity of Modi sharing seemingly friendly banter with both Xi and Vladimir Putin was a tactical win for the Indian prime minister, one that projected confidence at home and strategic balance abroad, even if it is likely to irritate policymakers in Washington.
The Power Gap
China’s economy is five times the size of India’s. But India is a fast growing economic powerhouse with huge momentum on its side. Its democracy, thriving tech ecosystem, and expanding strategic ties with the West give it leverage Beijing cannot easily counter. Xi may want stability with India, but China’s embrace of Pakistan and its unbending border posture make trust a fantasy. Modi’s handshake was pragmatic, not sentimental.
Despite tensions, China remains India’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $118 billion in 2023. This far outpaces India’s trade with the United States, which stood at about $87 billion. Yet this dependence coexists with mistrust, underscoring the paradox of the relationship.
What Each Side Wants
For this relationship to work, both sides have clear expectations. China wants India to stand firm on the One-China policy by refusing recognition of Taiwan and avoiding political legitimacy for the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan government-in-exile. It wants New Delhi to refrain from strengthening military infrastructure near the Line of Actual Control and to avoid challenging Chinese claims in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing also prefers India to keep some distance from U.S. strategic initiatives like the Quad, to ease restrictions on Chinese technology firms and investment, and to avoid undermining Belt and Road projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor.
India, in turn, expects peace and stability along the border to be non-negotiable. It insists that China respect the Line of Actual Control and reduce provocative deployments. New Delhi also wants Beijing to stop using Pakistan as a proxy to box in India regionally. India seeks fairer trade practices, a level playing field for its companies, and recognition of its strategic autonomy. What both want, though often in different language, is a framework where economic exchange and global cooperation can continue without recurring crises. Otherwise, these complex problems will continue to hang as a grey cloud over the relationship.
Domestically, Indian public opinion is deeply skeptical of China. Polls consistently show that a large majority of Indians distrust Beijing, making any talk of genuine friendship politically toxic for New Delhi.
America in the Middle
The complicating factor is Washington. The United States has raised tariffs on Indian exports, irritating New Delhi and sparking doubts about America’s reliability. In addition to the imposition of tariffs, the verbal diatribe against India from Trump advisor Peter Navarro and at times from Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is perplexing and an affront to India. It is these statements against India that are difficult to fathom. Could these frictions push India closer to China?
Unlikely. Tariffs are painful, but they are transactional. They can be negotiated away. Border clashes are existential. They cut to the core of sovereignty. India can argue with Washington about market access. It cannot argue with Beijing about mountains and rivers.
A Strategic Bet
That is why the U.S.–India partnership has more staying power. Both nations want an open Indo Pacific. Both worry about China’s rise. Defense exercises, tech cooperation, and the presence of a powerful Indian diaspora in America make this relationship far deeper than commerce. By contrast, trade with China remains significant, but it cannot paper over territorial hostility.
Strategic autonomy is the cornerstone of India’s foreign policy, and its multilateral engagements demand that autonomy remain intact. India will continue to balance ties with Russia, the Middle East, and even China. But balance does not mean equivalence. Managing China is about preventing crises. Partnering with America is about building the future.
Interests, Not Friends
In international politics, there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. The Tianjin meeting was a reminder of that axiom. India and China will keep trading. They may even cooperate on issues like climate and global health.
The United States may irritate India with tariffs, but those quarrels are temporary. With China, the disputes seem complex and permanent. The border will not disappear. Pakistan will not vanish from Beijing’s orbit.
So can China be India’s trusted friend? The honest answer is no. What is possible, and what both sides must manage, is coexistence without catastrophe. Friendship is a mirage. Managed rivalry is the reality. And India’s real bet lies not in Beijing’s embrace but in Washington’s partnership.