Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi outlined Mission Sudarshan Chakra – to be operationalised by 2035 – on Independence Day. In the context of this vision, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully tested a new integrated air defence system, consisting of a variety of weapons that shot down three targets at different altitudes and ranges, as per the statement of the defence ministry in late August.
The testing of the weapons at different altitudes and ranges signifies the multi-layered characteristic of India’s present and futuristic air defence system, which will encompass the weapon systems of the Indian Air Force and army air defence. The necessary capabilities for Sudarshana Chakra exist to an extent, but it is scale that is desired.
Future wars are largely going to be non-contact in nature, fought at large stand-off distances. Given the evolutionary nature of warfare, with no clear dividing line between the past, present, and future, it is imperative to prepare for both “old” and “new” kinds of warfare. Herein lies the criticality of blending the best of legacy and contemporary weapon platforms. This is applicable to Mission Sudarshan Chakra too.
The dynamic contexts of the present-day battlefield are marked by diverse campaign settings. It could be, for instance, a conventional conflict such as the Russia-Ukraine one, or irregular warfare that we see in densely populated areas in Gaza, or even combating State proxies, such as terror outfits sponsored by Pakistan.
The distances involved in terms of the range of combat shall also vary. It could be short-range, as it is in Ukraine, or long-range, as with Israel’s campaign against Iran and Ukraine’s campaign against strategic targets inside Russia. Or, it could be a mix of short- and long-range conflict.
However, amid the many variables, the common thread that is evolving is the deployment of unmanned aerial systems rather than manned ones. The texture of future force is going to shift from a small number of large platforms that are manned, expensive, and increasingly vulnerable, to one that will see a massive number of unmanned systems – either remotely piloted or automated – that are less vulnerable, much smaller, less costly, but still very effective.
Clearly, deployment of drones in combination with long- and medium-range missiles and rockets is the threat that the Sudarshan Chakra shall guard against. An air defence umbrella to ensure the safety of India’s citizens and assets is an inescapable imperative. In consonance, India’s armed forces must learn and adapt to future threats. The prerequisite for success is achieving a suitable blend of the new and the old.
Here, we need to take note of a few critical aspects. First, countering low-technology aerial threats such as drones will need low-technology and cheap solutions.
Second, air defence of assets will continue to be relevant and, as such, large-range weapon systems will have to be supplemented by smaller range systems that include shoulder-fired air defence weapons.
Third, the upgraded legacy systems will continue to form the backbone of integrated air defence. And finally, upgradation and acquisition will have to be carried out in a graduated manner so as to continue the optimal utilisation of legacies, without, of course, compromising on operational effectiveness.
Operation Sindoor marked a significant turning point in India’s air defence capabilities, demonstrating the effective integration of legacy air defence systems with modern platforms. India executed a series of strategic strikes against Pakistani military assets, showcasing the successful employment of multi-layered air defence capabilities, which included both modern and legacy systems.
In essence, Operation Sindoor was about the integration of legacy systems, such as the Pechora, OSA-AK, L70, and the indigenous Akashteer, with modern capabilities such as the S-400, SPYDER, etc. The framework of the proposed integrated Sudarshan Chakra shield should be an effective integration of the variety of air defence weapon platforms that India has in its inventory.
Against the general trend of relying exclusively on modern systems, Michael C Horowitz, Lauren A Kahn and others write in Foreign Affairs that “investing exclusively in precise mass systems like drones limits the targets a military is capable of destroying”. For example, Iran’s military exemplified the pitfalls of an over-reliance on low-cost weapons systems. Tehran has one of the most extensive drone programmes in the world, but because it lacked a modern air force, it couldn’t successfully strike well-protected Israeli military and civilian targets. The larger point is about the importance of combining legacy and modern equipment after due deliberations.
By simply chasing the newest technologies in the hope that they represent a magic bullet, the armed forces should not lose sight of the platforms and weapons that have hitherto been the cornerstones of the nation’s military power. In a multi-layered air defence system, which Sudarshan Chakra is meant to be, even man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), such as the good old Iglas, will have a role (of engaging the low-flying drones at short range).
Preparing for future warfare has never meant abandoning the past. India’s capability development is broadly aligned with achieving a suitable blend of the old and the new – except when it comes to the pace of acquisition and the scale of adoption that will be desired for Sudarshan Chakra. The blending of legacy and modern platforms is likely to be cost-effective, wherein the utility of older systems continues till replaced, provided operational efficacy is upheld.