New Delhi: India’s fighter engine diplomacy follows two parallel tracks – the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) co-developing a brand new powerplant with France’s Safran, and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) collaborating with the US’s GE Aerospace to domestically licence produce F-414 engines via technology transfer.
However, despite the announcements, both deals remain far from closure.
The Safran-DRDO project, unveiled only last week by Union defence minister Rajnath Singh, must now run the gauntlet of India’s notoriously slow procurement system, with the DRDO set to seek Ministry of Defence (MoD), and multifarious other, approvals for the USD 7-billion government-to-government (G2G) programme.
Alongside, the USD 1.5-2 billion GE-HAL deal to licence-produce F-414 engines – cleared by both governments in mid-2023 – remains stalled over pricing and the scope of technology transfer by the original equipment manufacturers (OEM).
The enduring tariff spat between New Delhi and Washington has only further clouded negotiations over the F-414, despite assurances by the US that bilateral defence cooperation between the two sides would proceed unhindered. But security officials quoted by The Indian Express over the weekend suggested that talks over the F-414 would soon resume, with a deal expected to be concluded within three months.
HAL and GE were unavailable for comment.
In the proposed deal with Safran – shortlisted over the UK’s Rolls-Royce and GE – the DRDO is pursuing development of a high-thrust turbofan engine in the 110-125 kilonewton (kN) class to power the later variants of India’s indigenously designed, fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). Though timelines for its development stretch to around 2035, the programme underscores India’s ambition, after decades of futile effort, for sovereign propulsion capability through joint design and technology tie-ups with Safran.
In parallel, the F-414 engine (98-99 kN) will power the Tejas Mk-2 light combat aircraft and also serve as the interim or ‘bridging’ powerplant for the AMCA Mk-1, tentatively powering its first two squadrons (around 30-40 fighters) until the indigenous DRDO-Safran engine is ready by 2035.
But this ‘engine hedging’ strategy comes with serious trade-offs.
For, while it may safeguard timelines and spread risk, a cross-section of veteran fighter pilot cautioned that running parallel engine lines could sow ‘complexity’ and ‘difficulty’ into the AMCA programme, offsetting many of the gains the two-power packs were anticipated to deliver, like boosting combat platform numbers. Presently, the IAF’s fighter squadrons were at their lowest-29 next month, after two MiG-21 ‘Bis’ squadrons were retired at Chandigarh-on par with the Pakistan Air Force, and well below its sanctioned strength of 42.5 squadrons.
These veterans maintained that fielding two engines across the AMCA variants – the GE F-414 for Mk-1 and a DRDO-Safran engine for Mk-2 – would obviously entail high redesign costs, longer test cycles, parallel maintenance pipelines, and above all, greater life-cycle expenses.
“Fighters are built around their powerplants: dimensions, intakes, cooling, fuel flow, centre of gravity and thrust-to-weight ratios, all of which hinge on the engine,” said a decorated three-star veteran combat pilot. Switching engines, he said, requesting anonymity, would necessitate fuselage, intake and flight-control redesigns, only adding delays, costs and test cycles to the entire enterprise.
Moreover, IAF pilots and mission planners would need separate training programs, simulators and doctrine adjustments for each such variant, increasing logistical complexity as the operational profile of the two platforms would be vastly different due to their engines. Maintenance crews too would face higher demands for specialised parts and procedures, inflating operational costs. And, at a time when defence budgets were constrained, these added financial and administrative burdens could slow induction schedules and reduce the IAFs overall combat readiness.
Meanwhile, the two-engine agreements also reflected India’s broader diplomatic equations: a trust-based, long-term partnership with France contrasted against a more transactional, technology-bound engagement with the US. Yet, it is important to stress that the ongoing India-US strains over tariffs only injected greater uncertainty into the F-414 deal, creating complications whose eventual outcome remained difficult to foresee or double-guess.
The recent delays in importing GE F-404 IN20 engines for the LCA Tejas Mk1A, for instance, further underscored the challenges arising from the slowdown in bilateral ties. The LCA Mk1A programme is currently facing a 15-month delay in engine supplies, negativelyaffectingthe IAF’s efforts to boost its shrinking combat fleet.
Alongside, the GEs F-414 programme, offering up to 80% technology transfer, seemingly stops short of parting with the most sensitive hot-section technologies and with intellectual property (IP) for the finished product, firmly retained by GE.
Industry officials point out that while HAL may gain the ability to machine and coat single-crystal (SX) turbine blades, the proprietary casting process – essential for producing them from scratch and critical for high-temperature, high-performance engines – is unlikely to be transferred.
Similarly, the FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) software, which governs engine performance and safety, is expected to remain remain under GE’s control, with only hardware elements produced locally. Core metallurgical expertise – such as proprietary alloy compositions used in hot sections – too are believed to be off-limits along with the completed products overarching IP rights, preventing India from independently modifying, exporting, or redeveloping the engine without GE’s direct approval.
Senior military veterans in Delhi, who had earlier been involved in negotiating technology transfers from the US on other programmes, said on condition of anonymity, that the GE-HAL arrangement was entirely consistent with Washington’s long-established ‘export-control culture.’ According to them, such agreements were invariably presented as landmark breakthroughs but were, in reality, carefully hedged and ‘tightly controlled’ by US vendors.
Furthermore, they added that technology transfers from the US were always “strictly calibrated,” designed to keep their partners – in this case India – dependent on American systems, while safeguarding Washington’s leadership in critical technologies.
Veterans further noted that the US consistently ‘ring-fenced’ its crown-jewel technologies essential to its partners for strategic autonomy, subjecting them to stringent International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which controlled the export, import and transfer of defence-related American technologies. Regardless of political goodwill, which between Delhi and Washington was presently depreciated, these technologies were rarely ever shared with any overseas partner.
By contrast, the Safran-DRDO project is structured as a true co-development programme, offering 100% technology transfer. It provides India full access to design and manufacturing expertise, along with shared IP rights, enabling independent adaptation, upgrades and long-term operational autonomy.
Such a wide framework allows the DRDO to independently adapt and upgrade the engine, tailor it to domestic requirements and even pursue exports without external approvals from Safran. By ensuring complete control over both the technology and its applications, the programme would strengthen India’s strategic autonomy in fighter engine development skills, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers.
Safran already has a strong footprint in India, as the country’s leading helicopter engine partner. Its Shakti/Ardiden engine family, jointly developed with HAL, powers the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter, its multiple variants, the Light Combat Helicopter Prachand, and the Light Utility Helicopter, all with proven high-altitude performance.
Parallelly, Safran is setting up a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) hub in Hyderabad to service LEAP engines that power Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 MAX commercial aircraft, as well as its M88 engines for the IAF’s 36 Rafale fighters and another 26 Rafale-M (Maritime) platforms, soon to be commissioned into the Indian Navy.
“At the heart of India’s twin fighter engine quest lies a deeper story of trust and reliability,” said another senior IAF veteran. But with the US, he said, India’s experience over the past 25 years has been one of promises tempered by export controls, deployment restrictions, and political strings; the F-414 engine agreement was unlikely to differ, he added, reinforcing the pattern of commitments offered, but hedged in practice.
Conversely, France has consistently demonstrated reliability in defence partnerships with India, dating back to 1953, when it supplied the IAF with 104 M.D. 450 Ouragan fighter-bombers – renamed ‘Toofani’ because the original French name was difficult for Indian technicians and personnel to pronounce. It subsequently supplied SA 315B Lama (Cheetah) and Alouette III (Chetak) helicopters, Mirage 2000H fighters, Scorpene submarines, alongside helicopter engines with full technology transfer and varied missile systems and force multipliers like radars, avionics and much else.
Industry officials and military analysts alike also recalled France’s ‘unstinting’ support for India after its 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, as a demonstration of Paris’s dependable partnership. While much of the world led by the US, imposed sanctions or condemned India for these tests, France maintained steady diplomatic engagement with Delhi, recognising its ‘sovereign right’ to determine its security needs itself in a turbulent neighbourhood.