The shift away from fossil fuels is reshaping global power balances. But beneath the push for cleaner energy lies a growing concern that could redefine energy security for decades ahead.
For years, energy security was largely defined by access to oil and gas. Governments worried about dependence on suppliers in the Middle East and Russia, while conflicts, shipping disruptions and geopolitical tensions frequently exposed the risks of relying on a limited number of producers.
As countries accelerate the move toward renewable energy, a new question is emerging, is the world replacing one concentration of power with another?
Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moscow supplied 45 per cent of the European Union’s natural gas imports. The outbreak of war forced European nations to rapidly seek alternative sources. Similar concerns resurfaced in the Middle East, where instability again showed the vulnerability of global energy flows linked to key transport routes.
Renewable energy offers a way to reduce exposure to many of those traditional chokepoints. However, the technologies driving the transition are heavily concentrated elsewhere, particularly in China, which has established a dominant position across much of the clean-energy economy.
China is now the world’s leading supplier of green technology. In July 2026, its green-energy exports climbed 51 per cent from a year earlier, while exports of new-energy vehicles surged by 90 per cent. The scale of that growth reflects China’s central role in supplying technologies increasingly relied upon by economies worldwide.
The country’s influence extends throughout the clean-energy manufacturing chain. It accounts for roughly 85 per cent of global solar production capacity and around 80 per cent of lithium-ion battery production.
In electric vehicles, China represented nearly three-quarters of worldwide output in 2025. Beyond manufacturing, it also occupies a powerful position in processing and refining key minerals needed for batteries, wind turbines and electric motors.
Dependence Has Shifted From Fuels to Supply Chains
The concern is not limited to finished products. China’s role stretches from mineral processing and industrial expertise to machinery and component production. That interconnected structure means disruptions in one area can ripple across the broader clean-energy sector.
The International Energy Agency estimates that a one-month interruption in Chinese battery supply-chain exports could reduce production at electric-vehicle factories outside China by about $17 billion, with Europe facing more than half of those losses.
Recent export controls on rare earth materials have reinforced concerns about concentrated supply chains. China mines roughly 60 per cent of the world’s rare earths and produces around 90 per cent of rare earth permanent magnets, a crucial component used across advanced technologies. The lack of readily available alternatives leaves manufacturers exposed to potential supply shocks.
Unlike oil reserves, which are determined by geology, China’s position has been built through investment, manufacturing expertise and industrial policy. In theory, that means competitors can develop alternatives.
Yet creating substitute capacity is neither quick nor simple. According to the IEA, more than 40 per cent of China’s battery-cost advantage over Europe comes from automation and manufacturing efficiency alone.
The debate increasingly centres on diversification. Efforts such as new rare-earth processing projects involving MP Materials, Saudi Arabia and the United States illustrate attempts to broaden supply sources. The central challenge is ensuring that the transition away from fossil fuels does not result in another form of strategic dependence.